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LIST OF ALL PARTIES

1. R. Bruce Stone (hereafter "Mr. Stone"), Appellant. Mr. Stone was the petitioner
below, and defendant in two small claims proceedings filed by the Appellee, Mr.
Slade.
2. Chris Slade (hereafter "Mr. Slade"), Appellee. Mr. Slade was the respondent below,
and plaintiff in two small claims cases filed against Mr. Stone.
3. James T. Bobo. Mr. Bobo was a second defendant named by Mr. Slade in the second
small claims action filed. He has recently been dismissed from the small claims action
when Mr. Slade elected not to pursue claims against him further. Mr. Bobo did not
participate in the case underlying this action.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This action was brought before the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)(J) (1953, as amended). The case has since been transferred to this Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1953, as amended). This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) and the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, § 5.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The following three issues are raised in this appeal:
1. Issue: Should a person who expects to be a defendant in a personal injury
action before the small claims court be allowed to obtain and preserve evidence pursuant
to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? This issue was raised in the appellant's
Verified Petition, R. 1, and in all proceedings afterward.
Standard of review: This issue relates to the interpretation of court rules, statutes,
and constitutional rights, as well as legal determinations of rules or principles which
4

should be uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and similar status in similar
circumstances. As such, the trial court's decision should be reviewed for correctness.
Parks v. Utah Transit Authority, 2002 UT 55, U 4, 43 P.3d 473; State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d
856, 858-859 (Utah 1995).
2. Issue: Should a person who expects to be a defendant in a personal injury
action before the small claims court be allowed to obtain and preserve evidence under
equitable doctrines? The equitable arguments in the underlying case were most fully set
forth in the Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition to Perpetuate Testimony, pp. 1011,7?. 32-34; though the petition invoked equity in asking for "Such other orders to insure
the petitioner is able to discover the facts necessary..." Verified Petition to Perpetuate
Testimony, p. 4, R. 4.
Standard of review: The standard of review for this issue is the same as that set
forth above.
3. Issue: When a person files a petition seeking to obtain and preserve evidence
under Rule 27 and equitable doctrines, does the filing of a small claims action by a
respondent to the Rule 27 action operate to terminate the person's right to obtain and
preserve discovery?

This issue was argued by the respondent, Mr. Slade, and is

implicated by the court's order that the defendant should exhaust all small claims
procedures. Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Request to Perpetuate Testimony,
p. 3-5, R. p. 14, Order Denying Petition to Perpetuate Testimony, R. p. 59.
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Standard of review: The standard of review for this issue is the same as that set
forth above.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises from a petition by Mr. Stone to obtain and perpetuate testimony
and other evidence pursuant to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and other
equitable principles. Mr. Stone, Mr. Bobo, and Mr. Slade were involved in a minor threecar rear-end accident in which Mr. Slade, the lead driver, claims he was injured. Record
(hereafter "7?."), p. 1. Mr. Slade's treatment, so far as it has been disclosed to Mr. Stone,
consists of a single visit with Dr. Mark D. Johnson the day after the accident and then
treatment with Doctors Plus. R., p. 1-2 Doctors Plus is a clinic widely recognized as
consistently providing treatment and charges that are excessive and not medically
reasonable and necessary. See R., p. 45. Billing records from Dr. Johnson indicate the
plaintiff had seen Dr. Johnson before. 7?., pp. 6 & 44. Reports of X-ray's ordered by Dr.
Johnson and Doctors Plus both indicate the plaintiff had significant pre-existing
degenerative changes to his cervical and lumbar spine. 7?., p. 2, 44.
Mr. Slade filed a small claims lawsuit against Mr. Stone in November 2002. At
the trial on that case, Mr. Slade apparently informed his counsel Mr. Bobo had struck him
first, and counsel then moved to dismiss that case without prejudice, i?., p. 2. That
dismissal was granted, over Mr. Stone's objection. Anticipating future litigation and Mr.
Slade's refusal to provide evidence, Mr. Stone filed his Verified Petition shortly after the
dismissal, i?., p. 1-4. Later, Mr. Slade's counsel sent a partial copy of a second Small
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Claims Affidavit, but it was apparently not marked as filed with the court until the day
Mr. Slade was served in this case, i?., p. 24. Mr. Slade has refused to produce any
additional evidence regarding his personal injury claims, prior medical history, or other
relevant material, and has resisted all efforts of Mr. Stone to obtain the same. R., p. 8-9.
Judge Bohling signed the final order denying the petition on May 29, 2003. /?., p. 59.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. The accident giving rise to the various suits occurred on December 5, 2001,
and was a minor rear-end type of accident. The Mr. Slade, Chris Mr. Bobo, and Mr.
Stone were drivers of the three vehicles involved.

Verified Petition to Perpetuate

Testimony (hereafter "Petition"), ffi[l-25 R. p. 1; Memorandum in Opposition to
Petitioner's Request to Perpetuate Testimony (hereafter "Memo, in Opp"), p. 2, ^J 1, R. p.
15.
2. Subsequent to the accident, Mr. Slade sought treatment from Mark D. Johnson,
M.D. once, the day after the accident. Affidavit of Dr. Neil Erickson, D.C, Iffl 4, R. p. 44.
3. The day after the accident Dr. Johnson took x-rays, which showed degeneration
of the spine at multiple levels that could not have been due to the accident. Id. fflf 5 to 9,
R. p. 44.
4. In his billing records, Dr. Johnson also used the CPT ("Current Procedural
Terminology") Code 99213, which indicates Mr. Slade was an established patient of Dr.
Johnson and had therefore seen him for prior treatment and/or evaluation. Id. at ^ 12 to
15,#. p.44-45.
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5. Mr. Slade subsequently sought treatment from Doctors Plus, a clinic whose
treatment is consistently determined to be excessive and not medically reasonable or
necessary. Id, ffif 17-20, R. p. 45.
6. Mr. Slade's pre-existing degenerative conditions in his spine were probably
symptomatic prior to the accident. Id., f 10, R. p. 44.
7. On or about November 27, 2002, Mr. Slade filed a small claims action against
the Mr. Stone only, alleging personal injuries as a result of the automobile accident and
requesting the maximum allowed under the small claims court jurisdiction. Petition *f 12,
R. p. 2; Memo, in Opp. ^ 5, R. p. 15.
8. At the trial scheduled for the small claims matter, Mr. Slade apparently
informed his counsel he believed Mr. Bobo was also at fault and the police report was in
error. Petition <fl 13, R. p. 2; Memo, in Opp. ^ 8, R. p. 16.
9. Mr. Slade then moved to dismiss his action without prejudice, with the stated
intention to file another action, which would also name Mr. Bobo as an additional
defendant. Petition ^ 14, R. p. 2; Memo, in Opp. ^ 9.
10. On February 27, 2003, anticipating Mr. Slade would again file a suit against
Mr. Stone in a forum in which he could argue no discovery should be allowed, Mr. Stone
filed his Verified Petition to Perpetuate Testimony, giving rise to this action. Petition, R.
p.i.
11. In a letter dated March 3, 2003, counsel for Mr. Slade forwarded an
incomplete copy of a second Small Claims Affidavit and Order, which did not indicate
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whether it was filed. In that letter, Mr. Slade's counsel also refused petitioner's prior
requests to voluntarily produce records and information by stating, "After reviewing the
medical records in the file, and after discussion with Mr. Slade, I am unaware of any
relevant pre-existing conditions..." March 3, 2003 letter and attachments, Exhibit A to
Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition to Perpetuate Testimony (hereafter "Reply
Memo."), R. pp. 36-37.
12. The only records or other evidence the plaintiff has ever produced are the
police report, records from Doctors Plus, and the record of the single visit with Dr.
Johnson the day after the accident. These were produced to the petitioner's insurer.
Memo, in Opp. ^ 3, R. p. 15; Affidavit of Dr. Neil Erickson, D.C. If 16, R. p. 45.
13. The Notice of Hearing and the Petition for the case underlying this appeal
were served on Mr. Slade on March 12, 2003. Constable's Proof of Service, R. p. 13.1
14. That same day, Mr. Slade's second Small Claims action against Ihe petitioner,
now including Mr. Bobo, was marked as filed with the Small Claims Division of the
District Court. Reply Memo, f 6 and Exhibit C, R. p. 24.
15. On May 29, 2003, Judge William B. Bohling entered his order denying the
petitioner's petition to perpetuate testimony.

Order Denying Petition to Perpetuate

Testimony, R. p. 59, attached as Addendum A.

1

The Constable's Proof of Service was attached to a copy of the Notice of Hearing
and Petition which the constable served. It appears it is therefore listed in the District
Court's Index as a second Notice of Hearing.
2
The District Court originally signed an order prepared by counsel for Mr. Slade,
to which the petitioner had objected. In a Minute Entry Decision and Order dated May
9

16. The Small Claims Court has subsequently stayed the second small claims case
pending this appeal. Small Claims Judgment, attached as Addendum B.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The underlying action is a petition by Mr. Stone to obtain and perpetuate the
evidence necessary to defend himself from Mr. Slade's claims of personal injury. The
rights to obtain discovery are guaranteed by several constitutional provisions. Included
among them are guarantees of Equal Operation of Law and Open Access to the Courts
found in the Utah Constitution, and the Procedural Due Process guarantees in both the
Utah and United States Constitutions. The small claims rules, on their face, do not allow
for any discovery if the plaintiff is not inclined to produce it voluntarily. Where the
plaintiff refuses to voluntarily comply with informal discovery requests, the result is a
trial hearkening back to the times when parties to a dispute in a law court did not have to
produce any discovery, and the trials were by surprise. Therefore, the equitable solution
for this ancient problem, long unused in the face of modern discovery methods, becomes
relevant. A separate action for discovery, either under Rule 27 or the equitable bill of
discovery, is the most appropriate way to vindicate a defendant's rights while maintaining
the simplicity of the small claims court.

29, 2003, the District Court indicated it had inadvertently signed it before the objection
had been presented to the court. Therefore the District Court vacated the prior order,
sustained Mr. Stone's objection, and entered the substitute order appealed herein. See
Minute Entry Decision and Order, R. p. 57; Objection to Respondent's Proposed Order,
R. pp. 54-56, and the vacated order, Order Denying Petitioner's Verified Petition to
Perpetuate Testimony, R. p. 51.
10

ARGUMENT

J. The Constitutions of Utah and the United States guarantee a defendant in every
civil case the right to obtain evidence for use in defending the case.
Early Utah and United States systems of discovery envisioned the issues of the
parties to be resolved upon facts ascertained through pleadings. In PHILLIPS, CODE
PLEADING,

Section 33, (2d Ed.) (1932). Throughout the development of common law, an

eternal dilemma presented itself of how to make procedural rules definite enough to work,
yet flexible enough to the litigants to allow justice. "Procedural rules are means to an
end, not an end in themselves." CLARK ON CODE PLEADING, p. VIII (1928). As the
continental system was developed, a considerable advantage was identified of
development of issues prior to trial with full safeguards granted to litigants. Id. at 13-14.
Also, in the development of the continental legal system has been the fundamental
ability of a party to a lawsuit to obtain and preserve evidence in which to frame the claims
and defenses thereto. Id. Unfortunately, many plaintiffs seek to deny evidence to a
defendant by choosing to file personal injury cases in the small claims courts of this state.
This choice is forum shopping in its most basic form. The small value of these cases are
not an excuse to deny a defendant the right to prepare an adequate defense.

That

argument is as cold a comfort to a potential defendant as it would be to explain to a shop
owner that he will be denied tools to protect himself from shoplifting as long as a
shoplifter agrees to take less than $5,000.
Utah law has historically preserved the right of a litigant to obtain evidence in
litigation. Prior to the enactment of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the common law
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in Utah specifically stated that rules of equity shall prevail over the rules of common law.
Utah Code Ann. § 88-2-2 (1933). As a court of law and equity, a court can render justice
to either party, even if the statute on its face limits access to vital information necessary
for the defendant's defense. See Trenchard v. Reay, 70 Utah 19, 257 P. 1046 (Utah
1927).
By 1933, Utah statutes had codified a method of taking and preserving testimony
(evidence) prior to litigation actually being filed. Utah Code Ann. § 104-52-2 (1933)
allowed perpetuation of testimony upon application to the judge by a person who expects
to be a party to a lawsuit and proof of some fact is necessary "in any other matter. . ." Id.,
at subsection (2). This statute was later changed to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 27 (patterned after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, initially
passed in 1937). The advisory committee notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 27, states this "rule offers a simple method of perpetuating testimony in cases where
it is usually allowed under equity practice or other statutes."
As the rules and laws of Utah and United States have long preserved a litigant's
right to obtain discovery with specific provisions in either statute or the court rules, the
right to obtain discovery is a right that has not been greatly commented upon by the
courts.

However, the courts have been clear the purpose of discovery rules is to

"...[facilitate] fair trials with full disclosure of all relevant testimony and evidence," and
".. .foster the fair and efficient exchange of information between the parties." Roundy v.
Staley, 1999 UT App. 229, ^ 11 and H 17, 984 P.2d 404 (Cert. Denied by Roundy v.
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Staley, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999) (Finding defendant should have produced surveillance
video used at trial to impeach plaintiff even though a specific request regarding
surveillance was not made.)

In a case where the Utah Supreme Court upheld the

dismissal of a party's action due to the failure to participate in discovery, the Court stated,
"A party to an action has a right to have the benefits of discovery procedure promptly, not
only in order that he may have ample time to prepare his case, but also in order to bring to
light facts which may entitle him to summary judgment or induce settlement prior to
trial." W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah
1977).
In filing the case in the small claims court, refusing to produce relevant evidence,
and fighting against discovery, Mr. Slade is actively pursuing a course of action which
results in a situation akin to what would occur if a plaintiff were allowed to take a case to
trial without complying with any of the defendant's discovery requests.

The Small

Claims Courts Statute defines the purpose of the hearing of a small claims court to
"...dispense speedy justice between the parties...," (Utah Code Ann. § 78-6-8(1), (1953
as amended)) not to simply dispense speedy judgments under conditions lhat favor one
party. Regardless of the set of rules established for a particular trial, to deny a defendant
ability and opportunity to obtain evidence necessary to prepare an adequate defense is to
abrogate a number of that defendant's constitutional rights.
In order to pursue reasonable discovery, Mr. Stone filed a separate petition to
obtain and perpetuate evidence prior to Mr. Slade's second suit. Clearly, Mr. Stone had a
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reasonable expectation he would be a defendant to an action cognizable before a court of
the State of Utah. He complied with the requirements of Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, and historically having established a need for the information, and with
the court left with the alternative of forcing a defendant to face a trial without relevant
evidence with which to defend himself is a failure of justice as contemplated by Rule
27(3). Mr. Slade's position below is that his subsequent filing of a small claims action
precluded the discovery Mr. Stone would otherwise have a clear right to obtain. This
argument is untenable. Even if the timing of Mr. Slade's second small claims filing was
innocent, allowing a small claims filing to trump all valid means to obtain and perpetuate
testimony would effectively nullify those means and render the provisions meaningless.
Clearly, if Mr. Slade had filed a District Court action, the underlying petition would be
moot, as that case would protect the defendant's right to obtain discovery. Until recent
developments in relation to personal injury suits in the small claims court, there did not
appear to be a reason for Rule 27 to be used for a personal injury case such as the
underlying case. However, as the law has developed, the provisions of Rule 27 provide a
means to allow the courts to protect an individual's constitutional rights to a defense, and
still allow small claims courts to proceed under simplified rules.
1. Equal Operation of the Laws requires the defendant be allowed to obtain
and preserve discovery.
The Utah Constitution, Article I, § 24 provides: "All laws of a general nature
should have equal operation." Recently, the Utah Supreme court has commented about
this constitutional provision as follows:
14

In order for a law to be constitutional under the uniform operation of laws
provision, "it is not enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is
that the operation of the law be uniform." "A law does not operate
uniformly if 'persons similarly situated' are not 'treated similarly' or if
'persons in different circumstances' are 'treated as if their circumstances
were the same.'" In other words, "[w]hen persons are similarly situated, it
is unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons from among
the larger class on the basis of a tenuous justification that has little or no
merit."
Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, \ 37, 54 P.3d 1069 (citations omitted). The Court went
on to state, "Therefore, the equal protection principle inherent in the uniform operation of
laws provision protects against discrimination within a class and guards against disparate
effects in the application of laws." Id. at ^| 38. If a provision affects a fundamental and
critical right to which the Utah Constitution has afforded special security, a heightened
scrutiny is applied, "[A] statutory classification that discriminates against a person's
constitutionally protected [fundamental or critical] right... is constitutional only if it (1) is
reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective
and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (3) is
reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal." Id. at % 42 (citations
omitted). See also Bishop v. GenTech, Inc., 2002 UT 36, ^ 14, 48 P.3d 218. The
classifications at issue in this case are those relating to parties of personal injury actions
in the District Court, as opposed to parties of personal injury actions in the small claims
department of that same court. These classifications relate to a fundamental and critical
right, the ability of a person to defend his or her person or property in the courts of this
state.
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If the small claims statutes and rules do not allow a defendant to obtain discovery
and a jury trial, this creates a disparity between the participants of small claims courts that
can be viewed in two distinct ways. First, there is a vast difference between the potential
plaintiff and the potential defendant. Second, defendants in a small claim court personal
injury case are treated vastly differently from defendants in similar personal injury case in
the District Courts. Appellant does not argue the provision of a small claims court to
provide a speedy remedy for simple cases is not reasonable. However, when those rules
and statutes combine to prevent a defendant from obtaining information necessary for an
adequate defense, it creates a classification that is not reasonable nor equitable and does
not further the objective of providing justice of any type, speedy or not.
The first classification results in a wide disparity in what rights are allowed to a
litigant. Potential plaintiffs are afforded the choice to sue for injuries in District Court
with the full benefits of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or extinguish those same
rights by filing a small claims court action if the plaintiff believes that would be more
advantageous to his case. The potential plaintiff may analyze whether his case will be
more valuable before a jury in the District Court, or, realizing his case and witnesses will
not "play" well to a jury, file it in small claims to extinguish a defendant's right to
demand a jury. The potential plaintiff may choose when to file a case in the District
Court and avail himself of the full powers of subpoena to obtain records, or file it in a
small claims court and extinguish the right of the defendant to use those same powers to
discover the plaintiffs past conditions and claims.
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Similar disparities are apparent for all the methods of discovery available. There is
simply no reasonable basis for a disparity which allows a plaintiff to chose whether or not
to allow an opponent to have access to the very procedures centuries of American
Jurisprudence have shaped into the today's legal system. Essentially, this allows a
potential plaintiff to conduct forum shopping, and in so doing select what rights a
defendant available for defense.

This disparity in the classes of litigants is not

reasonable, and it does not advance the objective of providing justice.
The second aspect of the classification this places on litigants is between personal
injury defendants in District Courts as opposed to the small claims divisions of that same
court. In the regular District Court, a defendant is afforded all the rights the petitioner
seeks to secure for himself in defending Mr. Slade's suits, and more. Indeed, a plaintiffs
actions in refusing to produce the information requested by Mr. Stone would subject that
plaintiff to the sanctions of Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. According to
the arguments of Mr. Slade, the defendant in small claims court has no ability to obtain
relevant evidence or other discovery when the plaintiff chooses the small claims forum.
The only factor distinguishing those District Court defendants from small claims courts
defendants is the choice the plaintiff made is selecting the forum.
This forum shopping does not advance the objective of "speedy justice," with
relation to either classification discussed above, only speedy judgment. Such is not a
reasonable basis for a classification which denies the defendant in small claims court the
same fundamental constitutional and equitable protections afforded defendants in the
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District Court. There is no apparent legitimate legislative objective for this classification,
nor does it appear to have any reasonable relationship between the classification and any
legislative purpose.
It could be argued the $5,000 statutory jurisdictional limit is a classification for the
purposes of this analysis. It is not a limit; rather it is a jurisdictional prerequisite. The
disparities above apply to all parties who may have a claim worth less than $5,000. In
other words, a plaintiffs personal injury claim may only be worth a few thousand dollars,
a jurisdictional limit does not affect those plaintiffs in any way. Further for classification
purposes it is no more reasonable a law denying a shop owner the right maintain
surveillance and other protective measures to capture shoplifters if the shoplifter agrees to
steal less than $5,000.
On the other hand, allowing a defendant in a small claims case to obtain discovery
of evidence through a Rule 27 petition or an equitable proceeding would cure this
problem. This would afford a process by which a defendant could obtain relief where
additional evidence not in the control of the defendant was necessary, but leave the
simple rules in place for other defendants where additional discovery is not necessary. In
the classic simple contract case so common to small claims court additional discovery is
not normally needed, as both parties were present and acquainted with the circumstances
surrounding the alleged contract. However, in a personal injury case the defendant is not
likely present for the plaintiffs medical treatment, and likewise has no knowledge.
Affording a separate proceeding to obtain the necessary evidence affords a method for a

18

defendant to vindicate his rights while maintaining the simple rules of procedure for the
other small claims litigants.
2. Preventing a personal injury defendant from obtaining evidence violates
the Open Access to Courts provisions of the Utah Constitution.
Utah's Constitution also provides a guarantee that all parties will have open access
to the courts. Article I, Section 11 states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
(emphasis added)
The typical analysis of this provision is directed toward causes of actions that are
eliminated, such as in Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989)
(Regarding a statute of repose.) However, the very terms of the Open Courts provision
indicates, ".. .no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending..." Therefore, this
provision clearly prevents abrogation of a defendant's rights to defend as much as a
plaintiffs right to file suit. The analysis set forth in Horton is as follows:
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of his
constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the substitute must be substantially
equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing essentially
comparable substantive protection to one's person, property, or reputation,
although the form of the substitute remedy may be different... Second, if there is
no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of
action may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective.
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Id. at 1094. This test can be applied equally to a defense to a suit. In this case, if Mr.
Slade's interpretation of the small claims statutes and rules prevails, those rules and
statutes operate to deprive the defendant of the tools necessary to discover and perpetuate
evidence necessary for an adequate defense in a personal injury case. Unlike a small
contract case between neighbors, personal injury actions require the fact finder to address
significant issues relating to pre-existing conditions and medical testimony on causation,
impairment, etc. For a defendant to defend against this, he needs to have the claims of the
plaintiff evaluated by his own medical and possibly other experts. This requires the
discovery of medical records, prior claims of injury, prior impairments, and likely further
data regarding the accident and damages to the vehicles. Simply put, personal injury
actions cannot be defended against by a brief perusal of a few records as the parties face
the judge.
The current rules foreclose all possibility for discovery with little more than an
encouragement that the parties exchange information. In the underlying case, it is clear
the plaintiff has a prior medical history, medical records must exist, and the plaintiff has
significant degeneration at multiple levels of his spine that could account for his
complaints. Precluding discovery in to this area effectively bars the petitioner from
mounting an adequate defense. Further, there is no alternate remedy provided to meet the
test.
As noted above, the $5,000 limit is a jurisdictional limit and can be no more than
illusory as an "alternate remedy." If Mr. Slade's cause of action were likely to be worth
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significantly more than $5,000, the case would have been filed in District Court. The
jurisdictional limit does not give the defendant any "alternate remedy," it only limits the
scope of the group of persons whose rights to defend will be abrogated. Again using the
example of a shop owner, it only limits the value of theft to which the owner has no
defense. Further, the small claims acts and rules do not eliminate any clear social or
economic evil. Instead, they may well foster a social and economic evil by encouraging
personal injury cases of very little merit be filed in small claims courts, where a defendant
is much less likely to be able to show how little merit they have. It is clear however, that
the use, or abuse, of the rules and statutes in this way is an arbitrary, unreasonable, and
unreliable method of encouraging "speedy justice," as it clearly favors one class of
litigants over another.
3. Procedural Due Process is violated by refusing to allow discovery of
evidence.
The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees both equal
protection under the laws and due process. The Utah Constitution provides many of the
same protections in Article 1, Sections 7 and 24. Indeed, the Utah Constitution provides
due process protection which is equal to or perhaps greater than the federal due process
protection. See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991); Sett v. Board of
Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991).

Due process under both federal and state

constitutions requires, at the very least, that all litigants be afforded the rights and
opportunities articulated in statutes and constitutional provisions governing both civil and
criminal proceedings.
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Procedural due process rights guarantee that "'[e]very person who brings a claim
in a court or at a hearing held before an administrative agency [have] a due process right
to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal.' As a general rule, 'due process demands a
new trial when the appearance of unfairness is so plain that we are left with the abiding
impression that a reasonable person would find the hearing unfair.'" Tolman v. Salt Lake
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). More specifically:
All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered,
and must be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, to inspect
documents and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way can a
party maintain its rights or make its defense. In no other way can it test the
sufficiency of the facts to support the finding.
D.B. v. Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the Dept. of Business
Regulation, 779 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Utah App. 1989). Further, the Utah Supreme Court has
held that where the credibility of a witness is critical to the outcome of the case, or where
the disputed evidence touches on expert assessments and opinions, the trial court may not
limit a party's evidence to proffers from counsel. Kawamoto v. Fratto, 2000 UT 6, 994
P.2d 187 (Utah 2000) (finding that the trial judge abused his discretion by requiring
defendant to proffer her rebuttal evidence in personal injury suit). Similarly, a defendant
in a personal injury action should not be required to defend himself without highly
relevant material evidence, such as prior medical records.

The evidence found so

important in Kawamoto would be impossible or at least greatly impaired by the inability
to obtain discovery. For a doctor to make a determination on medical causation, he must
necessarily consider the plaintiffs prior medical history and conditions. Preventing the
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defendant from asking a doctor to review the plaintiffs prior medical records prevents the
defendant from offering expert assessments and opinions, as surely as requiring only
proffered evidence. Similarly, refusing to allow a defendant to obtain evidence of the
plaintiffs prior history prevents cross-examination, at least to any extent that would be
effective.
In the underlying case, the few medical records provided indicate the plaintiff saw
a Dr. Johnson the day after the accident.

He took x-rays, which found significant

degeneration in the plaintiffs cervical spine. Such could not have been from the accident
the day before. In addition, the billing records for Dr. Johnson indicate the visit on that
day used a code that indicates Mr. Slade was an established patient. Clearly, Mr. Slade
has prior treatment and conditions that bear directly on causation in his personal injury
claims against Mr. Stone. Indeed, the records suggest the x-rays taken by Doctors Plus
conflict with those taken by Dr. Johnson.

Even so, the plaintiff will not produce the

films, which could shed some light upon this discrepancy.
A party to a suit is not fully appraised of the evidence if he is prevented from
obtaining discovery of relevant evidence for his defense.

A party is denied his

opportunity to cross-examine if he is prevented from obtaining information necessary for
effective cross-examination.

A party is denied the ability to offer evidence and

documents in rebuttal if he is prohibited from discovering and preserving that evidence in
the first place. This is the simple effect of Mr. Slade's choice to file his personal injury

Interestingly, The Doctors Plus records indicate their x-rays found degeneration
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claim in a small claims forum and then take the position he does not need to cooperate in
any further discovery. It is a blatant violation of Mr. Stone's rights to due process.
II. Equity allows a defendant the opportunity to discover and preserve evidence where
no other avenue exists to a defendant or possible defendant.
The position taken by Mr. Slade in the underlying case, that his choice of forum
prevents the defendant from obtaining any evidence by discovery or otherwise, places the
underlying claim into a litigation posture that has not been common in the United States
since the nineteenth century. As a result, Mr. Slade resorted to a procedure not utilized in
nearly as much time, the ancient bill of discovery and other equitable principles. It
appears this procedure was not utilized much in Utah, as even the earliest cases were able
to avail themselves of statutory and other discovery rules. The principal Utah case
discussing equitable discovery is Larson v. Salt Lake City, 34 Utah 318, 97 P. 483 (1908).
In Larson, the court considered whether a personal injury plaintiff could be compelled to
submit to a physical examination prior to trial. The Court discussed the general history of
equitable bills of discovery, but then decided as a court of law, the trial court could not
order a physical examination, "There can be no doubt that, in the absence of a statute, a
law court is not authorized to compel the plaintiff, before trial, to...make answers to
pertinent interrogatories...or concerning any other material issue..."

Id. at 487.

Therefore, Larson does not rule upon whether a bill of discovery is available, only that
the trial courts at that time did not have the power at law, as opposed to equity.
In reviewing the history of equitable discovery, however, the Larson court wrote,

at different locations in Mr. Slade's spine.
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...[The common law] generally allowed litigant parties to conceal from
each other, up to the time of trial, the evidence on which they meant to rely,
and would not compel either of them to supply the other with any
evidence... Hence there arose the equitable remedy of bills for discovery to
assist the prosecution or defense of an action pending in the lav/ court.
Such remedy being somewhat circuitous and expensive, the
Legislature... empowered the superior and other courts of common law...to
order the inspection and production of any document or writings, or the
inspection and examination of real or personal property.
Id. 97 P. 483, 486-7. Where Mr. Slade refuses to produce relevant evidence, and the
small claims statutes and rules to not provide for discovery in the small claims courts, this
case is propelled into circumstances equal to the historical circumstances described by
Larson. Indeed, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure preserve the option of a separate
action for discovery. Rule 27(c) provides "This rule does not limit the power of a court
to entertain an action to perpetuate testimony." Rule 34(c) provides "This rule does not
preclude an independent action against a person not a party for production of documents
and things and permission to enter upon land." The rules therefore recognize independent
actions for discovery of evidence both from parties and non-parties. Given the
developments in the law regarding small claims cases and discovery, the equitable powers
of the courts discussed by Larson have once again become relevant and allow the
defendant in a personal injury action to obtain the discovery necessary for a defense in a
separate action.
A number of other states allow equitable discovery actions under limited
circumstances.

In Wofford v. Ethyl Corp., 447 S.E.2d 187 (S.C. 1994), the South

Carolina Supreme Court held the administrator of the estate of an employee who

25

sustained a fatal injury on the job could maintain an equitable action for discovery against
the decedent's employer to inspect the employer's premises, documents and other
tangible things to determine whether a claim existed against a third-party. That court
recognized, "While modern discovery rules and liberal pleading requirements virtually
eliminate the need to resort to an independent action in the form of an equitable
proceeding for discovery, they do not totally displace the traditional equitable jurisdiction
of the court to issue appropriate orders for independent discovery when effective
discovery cannot otherwise be obtained and the ends of justice served."
The Connecticut Supreme Court discussed the bill of discovery allowed in that
state in Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333 (Conn. 1994), where one former business partner
sought evidence from his former partner and his bank for the purpose of determining
what causes of action, if any were available against the former partner. The Berger court
described the action as follows:
The bill of discovery is an independent action in equity for discovery and is
designed to obtain evidence for use in an action other than the one in which
the discovery is sought. As a power to enforce discovery, the bill is within
the inherent power of a court of equity that has been a procedural tool for
centuries. The bill is well recognized and may be entertained
notwithstanding the statutes and rules of court relative to discovery.
Furthermore, because a pure bill of discovery is favored in equity, it should
be granted unless there is some well founded objection against the exercise
of the court's discretion.
Id. at 337 (emphasis added). The Burger court found the petitioner met the requirements
to obtain the documents sought.
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In Temple v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 840 P.2d 561 (Mont. 1992), the Montana
Supreme Court recognized that "Although modern discovery rules and liberal pleading
requirements virtually eliminate the need to resort to an independent action in the for of
an equitable bill of discovery, they do not totally displace the traditional equitable
jurisdiction...to issue appropriate orders for independent discovery when effective
discovery cannot otherwise be obtained and the ends of justice are served." Id. at 564
(emphasis and citations omitted) (quoting Shorey v. Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co., Inc. 511
A.2d 1076, 1078 (Me. 1986)). However, to avoid "fishing expeditions," the Montana
Court went on to limit the theory to persons or entities who would not be defendants to a
contemplated action, noted each of the entities from which the petitioner sought evidence
was a potential defendant, and rejected the petitioner's arguments Rule 11 required him to
conduct the discovery prior to filing a complaint against the defendants.
The courts of other states have also held equitable discovery is available in the past
few decades. Davila v. Continental Can Co., 500 A.2d 721 (N.J. Super. A. D. 1985)
(citing the equitable bill of discovery as precedent, the court found an injured employee
could file suit against a "John Doe" defendant and name the employer as a defendant for
the purpose of identifying manufacturers of equipment that injured plaintiff), but see
Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., Inc., 762 A.2d 311 (N.J. Super. A. D. 2000) (Where
other identified defendant dismissed, defendant named for discovery purposes only could
not be maintained as a defendant.)(overruled 790 A.2d 884 (N.J. 2002));

Lutz

Engineering Co. Inc. v. Sterling Engineering & Construction Co., Inc., 314 A.2d 8 (R.I.
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1974) (Bill of discovery recognized as still available, though rendered obsolete for all
practical purposes by modem discovery methods. However, where Arbitration participant
sought a deposition and legislature was presumed to have deliberately left out a provision
for depositions in the specific public works arbitration statute which was found in the
general arbitration statute, the court ruled no deposition should be allowed.); Adventist
Health System/Sunbelt, Inc. v. Hegwood, 568 So.2d 1295 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1990)
(Mother whose child died at hospital was permitted to obtain a "pure bill of discovery" to
obtain information necessary to meet the pre-litigation requirements of Florida's
malpractice statutes.), but see Plublix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Frazier 696 So.2d 1369 (Fla.
App. 4 Dist. 1997) (Pure bill of discovery not available to potential workers compensation
plaintiff where the claimant merely wished to determine if he had any cause of action.)
Fewer courts have held a bill if discovery should not be allowed, though with the
possible exception of Kansas, most base this decision on the idea the modern discovery
methods and statutes make the bill unnecessary. For example, in Hardenbergh v. Both,
73 N.W.2d 103 (Iowa 1955), the Iowa Court held "The equitable action to obtain a bill of
discovery was long since abrogated by these later proceedings except as to certain
definitely prescribed matters." The Iowa Court then argued, "...[T]he new rules furnish
means for discovery, at law or in equity, which are broader than the former inherent
equity jurisdiction."

In other words, the Iowa Court felt the bill of discovery was

abrogated because it was no longer necessary.
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In Guertin v. Guertin, 561 N.E. 2d 1339 (111. App. 1990), the Court refused to
uphold a contempt order when siblings obtained an order from the trial court ordering a
sister-in-law to appear at a deposition to evaluate whether she exerted improper influence
to have the testator list her and her husband as joint tenants to certificates of deposit. The
Guertin court felt the bill of discovery had not been codified, and therefore vacated the
contempt order.
It appears the state most contrary to bills of discovery is Kansas. In Austin v.
Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc., 891 P.2d 1143, 1144 (Kan. App. 1995) the
court cited a prior Kansas decision in stating, "[Ejven under the federal rules, discovery
'does not constitute an unrestricted fishing license.'" (quoting Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v.
Gleson Hospital Inc., 360 P.2d 858 (Kan. 1961) (Insurance company which allegedly
discovered fraud by hospital in claims not allowed to obtain copies of records of
previously settled claims to determine if fraud existed in those prior claims.). In response
to the appellant's argument in the Austin case, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that the
amendment of the federal and Kansas rules of civil procedure with Rule 34(c) was to
eliminate confusion about whether Rule 34 would preclude actions for discovery in
jurisdictions where they were allowed. Id. at 1145. The Kansas court felt the Kansas
statutes did not create the right to pursue independent discovery action, finding
significance in Kansas's failure to adopt the 1991 change to Rule 34(c). Id. at 1145-6.
The common thread in the cases where an equitable discovery action was not
allowed is the fear a plaintiff will use equitable discovery actions as a "fishing
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expedition" to try and find a basis for a cause of action for which there is no independent
evidence. This is easily distinguishable from the case underlying this appeal. In this case,
the plaintiff has already filed suit, but refuses to produce evidence relevant to the claims
asserted by the plaintiff and which are necessary for the defendant to formulate an
adequate defense. What few records have been produced indicate there is probable cause
to believe additional relevant records and other evidence exists. Unfortunately, recent
developments in Utah Law allow a personal injury action in small claims court, but then
claim the defendant has no right to obtain the evidence universally recognized as
necessary to defend a personal injury action. Mr. Stone is not requesting a fishing
expedition to discover a cause of action against Mr. Slade, he is only requesting the
means to defend himself, means that have long been recognized in Utah Courts, and
which would vindicate his constitutional rights. In equity, Mr. Stone should be allowed to
obtain and perpetuate the evidence requested in his Petition.
III. A party to a lawsuit, or a person who expects to be made a party to a lawsuit, should
not have his or her right to obtain and perpetuate evidence trumped by an opposing
party's action in filing a Small Claims Affidavit.
The trial court's order below is essentially an argument that discovery cannot be
had in a separate action until all other procedures in the small claims court are exhausted.
This presents a classic chicken and the egg dilemma for Mr. Stone. The small claims
court could just as easily argue Mr. Stone must first exhaust his remedies to obtain
discovery in a separate action before the small claims court rules on the constitutional
issues raised by Mr. Slade's refusal to participate in discovery.
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The Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure, Rule 6(a) clearly states, "No formal
discovery may be conducted but the parties are urged to exchange information prior to the
trial." As noted by Mr. Slade in his opposition to the petition, Mr. Stone has attempted to
vindicate his constitutional rights before the small claims court.4 Those attempts have
been rejected without consideration. Indeed, the small claims courts could only vindicate
a defendant's constitutional rights by ignoring the rules. For this reason a separate action
for discovery is especially appropriate. A separate discovery action preserves the current
rules of small claims procedure intact, while still respecting a defendant's constitutional
rights to an adequate defense.
In its most common form, exhaustion of remedies is applied to reviews of
administrative proceedings, "We note at the outset of our analysis that 'parties must
exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review.'
Where this precondition to suit is not satisfied, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction."
Housing Authority of County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, ^ 11, 44 P.3d 724
(internal citations omitted). However, the small claims court is not an administrative
entity and this aspect of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine is inapplicable.
Another aspect of exhaustion of remedies is when a court proceeding is in reality a
review of a lower court or a collateral appeal, such as in an extraordinary writ proceeding.

4

In addition to the Jury Demand noted by Mr. Slade at Memo, in Opp., ^ 6, R. p.
15, Mr. Stone also submitted a bench memorandum and made verbal motions to obtain
discovery. Further, in the second small claims case Mr. Stone has attempted to file a
written motion to vindicate his constitutional rights to discovery. However, that motion
was rejected for filing by the clerk and recently at the judge, both in contradiction to Rule
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See e.g. Thomas v. State, 2002 UT 128, ^ 6, 63 P.3d 672 (Criminal defendant not entitled
to extraordinary relief where issues raised in petition either were or could have been
raised on appeal.); Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 1999 UT 12,ffl[5-6, 974
P.2d 286 (Corporation's attempt to obtain declaratory judgment an improper interlocutory
appeal where the same issues could have been resolved in a pending adjudicative
proceeding where an identical issue had been raised and adjudicated by the Tax
Commission.). However, the underlying action is a separate action from the small claims
actions filed by Mr. Slade. To be sure, Mr. Stone has attempted to raise his constitutional
rights to obtain discovery in the small claims court. In addition, Mr. Stone has raised
other issues which cannot be raised in this action, such as the right to a jury. Mr. Stone
also filed the underlying petition prior to the proceeding filed by Mr. Slade. It could be
just as easily argued Mr. Slade has not exhausted his remedies by seeking adjudication in
this matter before proceeding in the small claims court. However, by the rules of the
small claims court, the defendant's rights to obtain and perpetuate evidence cannot be
adjudicated in that court. In addition, if such a requirement were imposed, the provisions
of Rule 27, Rule 27(c) and Rule 34(c) would be meaningless, as no separate action for
discovery could be possible. Mr. Stone does not seek review of the small claims court's
decision, indeed that court has not yet made any relevant decision, instead, Mr. Stone
seeks to obtain and perpetuate evidence necessary to later defend himself in the small

6(b) of the Rules of Small Claims Procedure.
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claims proceeding. As that is not possible pursuant to the small claims court rules, a
separate action is the most appropriate method to obtain the required evidence.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Stone, as all potential defendants before any court of this state, has
constitutional rights to obtain and perpetuate evidence necessary for him to defend
himself in any court of this state. Unfortunately, recent developments of the law relating
to small claims courts has allowed personal injury plaintiffs to seek a trial while at the
same time denying and preventing their opponents any opportunity to obtain discovery of
highly relevant evidence necessary for the defense of a personal injury action. Because of
this, it is necessary to provide an alternate means by which a defendant may vindicate his
constitutional rights. A separate action for discovery pursuant to Rule 27, or an equitable
order allowing discovery is the most appropriate way to both allow a defendant to obtain
a fair trial and maintain the simplicity of small claims court rules. Therefore the appellant
requests this court to overturn the trial court's order and hold the defendant should be
allowed an order under Rule 27 or in equity to obtain the discovery prayed for in his
Petition.
DATED this

^

day of Octotober 2003.
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY

Todd A. Turnblom
Attorney for Appellant and Petitioner
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Addendum B
Utah Code Ann. § 104-52-2 (1933)

[519]

Title 104—Code o6 Civil Procedure

104-52-2

relating to depositions, so far as applicable and not inconsistent with
said sections shall apply to depositions pursuant to the said sections.
(C. L. 17, § 7177.)
CroBs-JiefereiicesU&e of reported testimony on subsequent trial, 1QR-45-&

CHAPTER 52
PERPETUATING TESTIMONY
104-52-1. Authorized a* Provided >»
This Chapter.
104-52-2. Application for — Grounds
—Procedure.
104-52-3. Powers of Persons Author104-52-4. Examination of witness —
Return.

3rt<i-J>2-5,

Payors Included ??» Return
£rima Facie Evidence of
Facts.
104-52-6. Use of Deposition—Objection and Exception.
Id.

1A4—|>2—!.. -Authorized as Provided itt THis Chspicr
The testimony of a witness may be taken and pen
provided
jn thi.? chapter.
(C.L. 17, §7193.)
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Cal. Cnii Proe. Cede, ? 2Q83, Idshr?
Codev 516-1101, Mont *Rcv. Codes,
§ 10t>$t> (identical).
Iowa Cod© 1939. § 11400 (testimony of
witness may be perpetuated in manner
I t d C - t ' A px^scriuCu/.
Cross-references.
Fees in proceedings to perpetuate tes*
timohy, 28-2-2.
Decisions from other jurisdiction*.
— CaliforniaCourt may take deposition of nonresident witness for u?e on new trial where
it is shown that h6 is the only -witness
on a material point and is under sentence of death in sister 9tate, even
though death sentence is later suspended,
and ths issue is not whether the testimony will be material to the issues already tried, but whether it will be materia! on a new trial, and mandamus will
lie to compel the court to issue a commission in a proper case. San Francisco
Gas Sz Electric Co v. Superior Court
of City and Countv of San Francisco,
15o Cai- 3D, 99 P. 359, 1? Ann. Cas. 933.
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24!) P. 2?C».
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which could be hy question and answer*
although failififir "t» set forth contemplated action. Kutner-GoIdsteiTi Co. v.
Superior Court of Fresno County, 212
Cal. 341, 298 P. 1001.
— MontanaA petition which states the facts requircc* by the- statute is sufficient, wad
an adverse party may be examined as a
witness. State v. District Court of
Seventeenth' Judicial District, 54 Mont.
574. 172 P. 329.

104-52-2. Application for—Grounds—Procedure
The applicant must produce to a district indge a petition verified by
his oath stating:
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CHAPTER 52
PERPETUATING TESTIMONY
104-52-1. Authori7ed as Provided in This
Chapter,
The testimony of a witness may be taken and

104-52-1—104-52-6

like service or publication of the notice, to take
tne deposition oi the witness named in the order
of the judge, or in the commission, or if more
than o^e witness is thy* nawigd, *vf such of +h#»m
as appear before him, at the time designated, and
to continue the taking of the same from time to
time.
(C. U 17, § 7195.)

perpetuated as provided in this -chapter.
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ft rri 0 9 \

Fee* A» proc^5u5«M9 *0 pi^rprt^iV fcc«t*3ii<my, £8-2-2.

104-52-2. Application for—Grounds—Procedure.
The applicant must produce to a district judge
a petition verified hj his oath stating.
(1) That the applicant expects to be a party
to an action in a court in this state, and in such
case the names of the persons who he expects
will be adverse parties; orr
(2) That the proof of some fact is necessary
to perfect the title to property in which he
is interested or to establish marriage, descent,
heirship, or any other matter which it may hereafter become material to establish, though no
suit may at the time be anticipated, or if anticipated, -Jie may not know the parties to such suit;
3.7* Uf

104-52-4. Examination of Wltaess—Ketarflu
The examination must be by tjuestios and
answer, and if tho testimony is to be taken in
another state or territory, it must be taken upon
a commission to be issued by the judge allowing
the examination, under the seal of the court of
which he is judge, and upon interrogatories to
be settled in the same manner as in cases of depositions taken under commission in pending
aclions, unless the parties expectant, if known,
otherwise agree. If such parties are unknown,
notice of the settlement of the interrogatories
shall be published in some newspaper for such
time as the judge may designate. The deposi*
tion when completed mu9t be carefully read to,
and subscribed by, the witness, then certified
by the officer or person taking tho same, and
shall then be sealed up and delivered or transmitted to tb£ clerk of th€ court designated 5n the

(3) Th* tiAmp of thp wifneAS to b* examined, his place of residence, and a general outline of the facts expected to be proved.
The judge to whom such petition is presented

who shall file the same when received. The
judge allowing the examination shall file with
the clerk the order for examination, the petition

must make an order allowing the examination,

on which the same was granted, with proof of

and des?prnsLt!TS£ ths officer before whom the
game must be taken and prescribing the notice
to be given. Such notice, if the parties expectant
are known and reside in this state, must be formally served, and if unknown, sucn nonce must
be Served uli tbe recorder of the county where
Hm property to he affected by the evidence is
situated or the judge making the ordrr resides,
as may be directed by him, and by publication
thereof in some newspaper, to be designated by
the judge, for the same period required for the
publication of summons. The judge must also
designate in his order the clerk of the c«urt to
whom the deposition must be returned when
taken.
(C. L. 17, § 7194.)

OTAPT of thp judge allowing the reami nation,

(C, L 17 § 7196 )

104-52-5. Papers Included in Beturn Prima
Facie Evidence of Facts.
The petition, order snd other papers filed by
tion, or a certified cony thereof are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein to sho* compliance with the provisio ns of this chapter.
^C. h 17, § 7)97.)
104-52-6

Use of Deposition—Objection atid
Exception.
If a trial is had between the parties named in
Publication ©f euoimoce, 101-5-13.
the petition as parties expectant, or their suci04~52-3. Powers of Persons Authorized to cessors in interest, or between any parties wherein it may be material to establish the facts which
i a K 6 xscpOSitiCn*
The person appointed hy the JU.&&Q to tike th**5D/»h depositions pro^ or tend to prove, upon
^position is authorized, if a resident of this proof of the death or insanity of the witnesses,
[jfetate, on receiving a copy of the order of the or that they cannot be found, or arc unable by
[fudge and of the notice prescribed in the next reason of age or other infirmity to give their
preceding section, with proof of its personal testimony, ihe deposiiiojas or copies thereof may
iferVics or publication, or, if a resident without be used by either patty subject to all legal
me state, on receiving the commission mentioned objections; but if the parties attend at the exam• a the next succeeding section, with proof of ination, no objection to the form of an ioterrog-

104-52-3

Title 104—Code of Civil Procedure
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(1) That the applicant expects to be a parly to an action in a court
in this state, and in such c&<e the names of the persona who he expects
will be adverse parties; or,
(2) That the proof of some fact is necessary to perfect the title to
property in which he is interested or to establish marriage, descent,
heirship, or any other matter which it may hereafter become mnteiial
to establish, though no suit may at the time be anticipated, or if anticipated, he may not know the paxtw to such su*t; and,
(3) The name of the wirnpss to hr examined, his place of residence, and a general outline of the facts expected to be proved.
The judge to whom such petition is presented must make an order
allowing the examination, and designating the officer before whom the
same must be taken and prescribing the notice to be given. Such notice,
if the parties expectam are known and reside in this state, must be forma))y served, and if unknown, such notice must be served on the recorder of the county where the property to be affected by the evidence
is situated or the judge making the order reside, as may be directed by
him, and by publication thereof in some new&paper, to be designated by
the judge, for the same period required for the publication of summons.
The judge must also designate in his order the clerk of the court to
whom the deposition must be returned when taken. (C L. 17, § 7194.)
1.
Tma section is practically identical
with Laws 1851-1870, MT>, 2 Comp
L*ws 1888. §S967.

Testimony of jx»r«?on not expected to
live.

Testimony ol injured person nor expected to live could be perpetuated under
I s/» •> v • v *

Comparable provisions.
CftL CiviJ Proc Code, ^2084 (Stfbstaneluding paragraph- " * T T must be
served" on the cleric of the county where
r
the proper* v
°
*
>'' siUiAl^d
Idaho Code, s 16-2102. >tont "Rev
Codes. § 10087 (substantiaHv tha qamc)

i-k»»o

3v«v«uv\.

Jit

^nukv.cvitu^

"instituted by his wi£c on behalf of herself and their minor children
Ohio
Copper Min C^. ,r . H^le^'Sp? "*?2 P.
201.'
~
""'
A L U TI nte*
Right to dietrovpTy n.*: TPgarfa

facts

ix-iSLLjun lf» a m o u n t ox riiiliT.^es., «o

A,

L R. 504

Cr3vcis-r&f&renc££.'
Publication of sumwoT)^ l(M- f >-l'!.

104-52—3. Powers of Pei-sans Au*h«nzed t^ Take Dep^c^on.
The p*r?07i zvv™"ted by the judge to t:?ke the deposition is authorwed, if a resident of this state, on receiving a copy of thp ord^r af the
judge and of the notice prescribed in the next preceding section with
proof of its personal service or publication, or, if a resident without
the state, on receiving the commission mentioned in the next succeeding
section, with prool of like service or publication of the notice, to take
tho deposition of the witness named in the order of the judge, or in the
commission, or iC mere th^n one "witness is thus narru d, of such of them
as appear before him, at the time designated, and to continue the taking
of the s»me f^om time to time.
(C L 17 S 7195 )
CaJ Cnnl Proc. Codn, §2085, Idaho
Code §lt>—nfi3, Mont. K.pv. Codes.
5 10688 <«rah*UntiaUv identical!

Addendum C
Small Claims Statutes

SMALL CLAIMS COURTS

78-6-1

CHAPTER 6
SMALL CLAIMS COURTS
Section
78-6-7
78-6 H

Section
78-6-1.

Smail claims — Defined — Biannual review — Counsel not necessary — Deferring multiple
claims of one plaintiff — Supreme" Court to govern procedures
78-6-1 5
Evening hours — Judges pro tempore.
78-6-2 to 78-6-5
Repealed
78-6-6
Assignee may not file claim

Repealed
Object of small claims — Attachment, garnishment, and execution
78-6-9
Repealed
78-6-10
Appeals ~- Who may take and
jurisdiction
78-6-11 to 78-6-13 Repealed
78-6-14
Civil filing fees
Costs
78-6-15

78-6-1. Small claims — Defined — Biannual review —
Counsel not necessary — Deferring multiple
claims of one plaintiff — Supreme Court to govern procedures.
(1) A small claims action is a civil action:
(a) for t h e recovery of money where the amount claimed does not exceed
$5,000 including attorney fees but exclusive of court costs and interest and
where t h e defendant resides or the action of indebtedness was incurred
within t h e jurisdiction of the court in which the action is to be maintained;
or
(b) involving interpleader under Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, in which the amount claimed does not exceed $5,000 including
attorney fees but exclusive of court costs and interest.
(2) The judgment in a small claims action may not exceed $5,000 including
attorney fees but exclusive of court costs and interest.
(3) Counter claims may be maintained in small claims actions if the counter
claim arises out of the transaction or occurrence t h a t is the subject matter of
the plaintiff's claim. A counter claim may not be raised for the first time in the
trial de novo of the small claims action.
(4) The Judicial Council shall present to the Judiciary Interim Committee
prior to the general session of the Legislature during odd-numbered years a
report and recommendations concerning the maximum amount of small claims
actions.
(5) Persons or corporations may litigate actions on behalf of themselves in
person or through authorized employees with or without counsel.
(6) If a person or corporation other than a municipality or a political
subdivision of t h e state files multiple small claims in any one court, the clerk
or judge of the court may remove all but the initial claim from the court's
calendar in order to dispose of all other small claims matters. Claims so
removed shall be rescheduled as permitted by the court's calendar.
(7) Small claims matters shall be managed in accordance with simplified
rules of procedure and evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
3upp., 104-6-1; L. 1953, ch. 55, § 1; 1901, ch.
80, § 1; 1969, ch. 256, § 1; 1970, ch. 26, § 1;

1977, ch. 77, § 61; 1977, ch. 78, § 28; 1983,
ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 48, § 1; 1986, ch. 187,
§ 2; 1991, ch. 268, $ 42; 1992, ch. 127, § 14;
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1993, ch. 177, * 1; 1995, c h . 47, § 3; 1996, c h .
198, ^ 61; 1997, ch. 215, * 19.
Cross-References. — Justice courts, § 78-

5-101 et seq jurisdiction m small claims ca«-es,
§ 78-5-104(2)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
with small claims court over civil claims under
statutory limit H a n o u r t , Brace, Jovanovich
Legal & Professional Publications, Inc v Gordon, 635 P 2 d 28 (Utah 1981) (decided under
pnoi law)

ANALYSIS

Action by corporation
—Necessity for attorney
Effect of affidavit
Jurisdiction
—Concurrent
—Fraud or misrepresentation
— Nature of action
—Relief sought
Action by corporation.
— N e c e s s i t y for attorney.
Even though a corporation was a "person"
which could maintain an action m a small
claims court, a corporation could not practice
law and an officer or employee of a corporation
could not properly institute an action in the
small claims court, it was required to act
through a licensed attorney Tuttle v Hi Land
Dairyman's Ass'n, 10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P 2d 616
(1960) (decided undex prior law)
Effect of affidavit.
The language on the back cf a small claims
affidavit although containing directions con
cermng evidentiary procedure that are binding
on the parties, does not have the status of rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court as contemplated by Subsection (7) Kawamoto v Fratto,
2000 UT 6, 994 P 2d 187
Jurisdiction.
—Concurrent.
District court has concurrent jurisdiction

— F r a u d or m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
While the jurisdiction of t h e small clnms
couit is limited to claims for money only the
small claims court is not divested of jurisdiction
where fraud or misrepresentation is alleged as
the basis for lecoveiy, therefore, small claims
court had jurisdiction to entertain a food stamp
fraud case involving the recovery of $270
Kapetanov v SmalJ Claims Court, 659 P2d
1049 (Utah 1983)
— N a t u r e of action.
Neither automobile accident peisonai njury
cases nor cases involving expert testimony are
excluded from the small claims courts'junsdic
tion Kawamoto v Fratto, 2000 UT 6, 991 P 2d
187
—Relief sought.
Small claims junsdiction is not lmmed to
those cases where the plaintiff is seeking liquidated, rather than general, damages Kawa
moto v Fratto, 2000 UT 6, 994 P2d 187
The phrase "action for indebtedness" d >es not
limit the type of damages necessary for c ises to
be heard by the small claims courts Ra her, it
provides small claims courts with an < Iternative location to the defendant's residenc e upon
which to base jurisdiction Kawamoto v Fratto,
2000 UT 6, 994 P 2d 187

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Salt Lake County
Bar's Small Claims Court Project, 1978 Utah L
Rev 701
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — P a i t III,
1995 Utah L Rev 683
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am J u r 2d Courts $ 31
C.J.S. — 21 C J S Courts ^ 106
A.L.R. — Operations of collection agency as
unauthorized practice of law, 27 A L R 3d 1152

Right of party litigant to defend or < ounterclaim on ground that opposing part} or his
attorney is engaged m unauthorized pr ictice of
law, 7 A L R 4th J146
Malicious prosecution defense of a ting on
advice of justice of the peace, magistrate, or lay
person, 48 A L R 4th 250
Small claims jurisdictional limits as binding
on appellate court, 67 A L R 4th 1117

78-6-1.5. Evening hours — Judges pro tempore.
The district or justice court may request that the Supreme Court appoint a
member of the Utah State Bar in good standing, with the member's consent, as
judge pro tempore to hear and determine small claims at times, including
evening sessions, to be set by the court Such judges pro tempore, aft< r being
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duly sworn, shall serve voluntarily and without compensation at the request of
the court, shall be extended the same immunities, and shall have the same
powers with respect to matters withm the jurisdiction of the small claims court
as may be exercised by a judge thereof
History: C. 1953, 78-6-1.5, e n a c t e d b y L.
1981, ch. 88, $ 1; 1991, ch. 268, <> 43; 1996,
c h . 198, <> 62.

Cross-References. — Jurisdiction of dist n c t court judges, § 78-3-4

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Construction and validity of state
provisions governing designation of substitute,
pro tempore, or special judge, 97 A L R 5th 537

78-6-2 to 78-6-5. Repealed.
R e p e a l s . — Laws 1991, ch 268, ^ 49 repeals
*ft 78-6-2, 78-6-2 2, and 78-6-2 5, as last
amended by Laws 1990, ch 59, **§ 33 to 35,
relating to small claims courts affidavit, order,
and form, form for interpleader actions, and
authorization for counterclaims and form for
counter affidavit, respectively, effective J a n u ary 1, 199z
Laws 1991, ch 268, § 49 repeals §§ 78-6-3
and 78-6-3 5, as last amended by Laws 1990,
ch 135, § 1 and as enacted by Laws 1986, ch
^n c o
i x
J.
*
r ni
r
48, § 3, relating to preparation of filing of
amdavit and counter affidavit and service of

order in small claims court and to preparation
and filing of interpleader affidavit, respectively,
effective J a n u a r y 1, 1992
Laws 1991, ch 268, % 49 repeals §§ 78-6-4
a n d 78-6-5, as last amended by Laws 1987, ch
233, ^ 1 and as enacted by Laws 1951, ch 58,
§ i relating to time for notice and appearance
m s m a n claims court and to requirement of
enumerating entries m the docket, respectively,
e f f e c t l v e J a n u a r y 1, 1992
«
,,
U1
TTA ,
For comparable provisions, see the Utah
R u l e s o f S m a l l Claims Procedure

78-6-6. Assignee may not file claim.
No claim shall be filed or prosecuted in such small claim court by any
assignee of such claim
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ^ 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-6-6.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am J u r 2d Courts § 31

78-6-7.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1991, ch 268, § 49 repeals
§ 78-6-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating

to witnesses m judgment m small claims court,
effective J a n u a r y 1, 1992

78-6-8. Object of small claims — Attachment, garnishment, and execution.
(1) The hearing in a small claims action has the sole object of dispensing
speedy justice between the parties. The record of small claims proceedings
shall be as provided by rule of the Judicial Council.
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(2) Attachment, garnishment, and execution may issue after judgment as
prescribed by law, upon the payment of the fees required for these services.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ^ 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-6-8; L. 1961, c h . 180, ^ 1; L986,
ch. 47, * 75; 1988, ch. 73, § 3; 1988, ch. 248,
* 40; 1991, ch. 268, * 44; 1997, ch. 215, ^ 20.
Cross-References. — Attachment, Rule
64C U R C P

Execution, Rule 69, U R C P
Exemptions from execution, § 78-23-1 et seq
Garnishment, Rule 64D, U R C P
Wrongful attachment injustice court, misdemeanor, monetary penalty, § 76-8-603

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jui 2d Courts § 31

U t a h L a w R e v i e w . — Recent Developments
m Utah Law, 2000 Utah L Rev 841 (2000)

78-6-9.

Repealed.

R e p e a l s . — Laws 1991 ch 268,*} 49 repeals
*} 78 6 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating

to judgment against defendant and payment in
small claims courts, effective January 1, 1992

78-6-10. Appeals — Who may take and jurisdiction.
(1) Either party may appeal the judgment in a small claims action to the
district court of the county by filing a notice of appeal m the original trial court
within ten days of the notice of entry of the judgment If the judgment in a
small claims action is entered by a judge or judge pro tempore of the district
court, the notice of appeal shall be filed with the district court
(2) The appeal is a trial de novo and shall be tried in accordance with the
procedures of small claims actions, except a record of the trial shall be
maintained The trial de novo may not be heard by a judge pro tempore
appointed under Section 78-6-1 5 The decision of the trial de novo may not be
appealed unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, * 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-6-10; L. 1986, ch. 47, ^ 76; 1988,
ch. 73, i? 4; 1996, ch. 198, * 63; 1997, ch. 215,
<> 21.

Cross-References. — A ppeal from district
court to Court of Appeals, § 78-2a-3
Trial de novo, ^ 78 3 4(5)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
defendant's right Liedtke / Schettler, 649 P 2 d
80 (Utah 1982)

ANAIYSIS

Constitutionality
—Limitation on plaintiff's right to appeal
—Time for filing notice of appeal
Notice of entry of judgment
Cited
Constitutionality.
— Limitation o n plaintiff's right to appeal.
This section does not violate the tqual pro
tection guarantees of the state constitution by
its limitation of plaintiff's right to appeal only
from judgment against him granted on a coun
terclaim to defendant while not so limiting

—-Time for filing n o t i c e of appeal.
Given the nature and purpose of the small
claims court it was not unreasonable for the
Legislature to differentiate between it and city
and district courts with respect to the time
allotted foi filing a notice of appeal, therefore,
the statute does not violate the equal protection
clause Larson Ford Sales, Inc v Silver, 551
P2d 233 (Utah 1976) appeal dismissed, 429
U S 909 97 S Ct 299, 50 L Ed 2d 277 (1976)
(decided under prior law)
N o t i c e of entry of j u d g m e n t .
Subsection (1) provides that a party must
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receive actual notice that a small claims judgment has been entered before the ten-day appeal period commences and in the absence of
evidence that a notice of appeal was filed more
than ten days after the defendant or his attorney received actual notice of a judgment, the
appeal must be deemed timely and heard on its

78-6-15

merits Chevron v Grant 831 P 2d 1038 (Utah
Ct App 1992;
C i t e d m Salt Lake- City Corp v Leah>, 848
P.2d 179 (Utah Ct App 1993), Kawamoto v
Fratto, 2000 UT 6, 994 P2d 187

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees m
Utah, 1984 Utah L Rev 553
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 2000

Utah L Rev 841 (2000)
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jui 2d Courts i? 31

78-6-11 to 78-6-13. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1986, ch 47, % 80 repeals
§ 78-6-11, as amended by Laws 1981, ch 90,
§ 17, relating to the procedure for taking appeals
Laws 1991, ch 268, § 49 repeals §§ 78-6-12,
Utah Code Annotated 3953, relating to abstract
of judgment for plaintiff in small claims courts,

78-6-12 5, as enacted by Laws 1983, ch 77, ^ 4,
relating to abstract of judgment for defendant
m small claims court, and 78-6-13, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, relating to filing of abstract
and docketing of judgment m small claims
courts, effective January 1, 1992

78-6-14. Civil filing fees.
(1) Except as provided in this section, the fees for a small claims action in
justice court shall be the same as provided in Section 78-7-35.
(2) Fees collected in small claims actions filed in municipal justice court are
remitted to the municipal treasurer. Fees collected in small claims actions filed
in a county justice court are remitted to the county treasurer.
(3) (a) Seven dollars and 50 cents shall be withheld from the fee for the
small claims affidavit and allocated to the Judges' Retirement Trust Fund.
Five dollars shall be withheld from the fee for a small claims counter
affidavit and allocated to the Judges' Retirement Trust Fund
(b) Two dollars withheld from the civil filing fee in a court of record as
provided in Subsection 63-63a-8(4)(b) shall not apply to the fees collected
for small claims actions in justice court.
(4) The fee in the justice court for filing a notice of appeal for trial de novo
in a court of record is $10. The fee covers all services of the justice court on
appeal but does not satisfy the trial de novo filing fee in the court of record.
History: C. 1953, 78-6-14, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 290, § 10; 1997, ch. 215, § 22; 2001,
ch. 46, <j 27.
R e p e a l s and R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws
1992, ch 290, § 10 repeals former § 78-6-14, as
last amended by L 1991, ch 268, § 45, listing
civil filing fees, and enacts the present section,
effective July 1, 1992.

A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "Section 78-7-35" for "Section 21-1-5" m Subsection
(1)
Cross-References. — Justice courts, Chapter 5 of this title.

78-6-15. Costs.
The prevailing party in any small claims action is entitled to costs of the
action and also the costs of execution upon a judgment rendered therein.
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